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Crosskey or that, knowing of him, felt incompetent to do battle with him-
hardly seem plausible.
The book's omissions, contradictions and inconsistencies could be multi-
plied almost endlessly. The longer Kilpatrick writes, the more straw he strews
about his pages, the deeper he cuts into the underpinning of the very position
he outwardly defends. James Jackson Kilpatrick is clearly an intelligent man.
He was a prot~g6 of the late Douglas Southall Freeman and is now the
editor of a large daily newspaper. His several hundred footnotes and citations
are evidence of considerable research and laborious writing. Could such a
learned and well-trained man have been unaware of the deficiencies in his
overt arguments? Did he not realize that careful readers would immediately
heap ridicule on his stated conclusions? Or did he have a deeper design?
Perhaps his opening sentence points to a hidden purpose. He writes:
"Among the more melancholy aspects of the genteel world we live in is
a slow decline in the enjoyment that men once found in the combat of
ideas, free and unrestrained. Competition of any sort, indeed, seems to
be regarded these days, in our schools and elsewhere, as somehow not
in very good taste."35
This could be a warning that the writer (who subtitles his book Notes of a
Citizen of Virginia) dares not openly oppose the ideas prevalent in his home
state; that we are witnessing a courageous southern editor who has chosen
his own form of social protest for other men, less affected by emotion, to
read and understand.
WALTER F. MuRPHYt
POLITICAL POWER AND THE GOVERNMENTAL PRocEss. By Karl Loewenstein.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957. Pp. ix, 442. $6.00.
BASED on six lectures given at the University of Chicago in 1956, this book
is the pilot study for a much larger work which, when completed, should be
a significant contribution to the study of comparative government. This is not
to say that Professor Loewenstein has at this time served only an hors d'oeuvre
with the main course reserved for the future; for this book contains the sub-
stance of the author's thesis. Its present importance-the presentation of his
concept of power as the key to the analysis of government-may even appear
more sharply in this condensed form.
Loewenstein is striving for a framework which expresses the "reality" of
the political process, rather than its philosophical or conceptual basis. His
premise is that "power" can be used as a unifying "conceptual framework"
against which to compare one nation's government with another's.1 In his
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view, all society is a system of power relations; hence, to know society, one
must look to the power structure within it. The predominant organization
within society, the state, can be meaningfully and realistically studied by examin-
ing the interaction between the government (the "power holders") and the
governed (the "power addressees").2
Superimposed on this theory, however, and implicitly or explicitly recurrent
throughout the book, is the author's belief in the demoniac nature of power. Un-
controlled power, he says, is "evil as such," for man's nature cannot accom-
modate absolute power with moderation and self-restraint. 3 This is a moral
judgment, and the author in making it goes beyond the "reality" he avows.
His major division between forms of government, then, becomes one between
autocracy and constitutionalism. In autocracy, power is concentrated without
effective restraint in a single power holder, while the constitutional state is dis-
tinguished by its multiple power holders. This sharing of power in the consti-
tutional state necessarily controls its exercise, preventing man's dangerous, in-
herent lust for power from complete self-realization.
The main portion of the book is devoted to a detailed discussion of those
forms and techniques of government which operate to control power. To this
discussion Professor Loewenstein brings an amazing knowledge which, rather
than appearing pedantic, is effectively used to provide comparisons. And this
is truly a comparative study. His source material includes feudal Aragon and
contemporary Ethiopia, the ancient Greek polis state and the modern United
States. References are sharp and precise and always in balance with the format
of the book, so that they become illustrations, not overwhelming ends in them-
selves. In these comparisons lies the primary usefulness of his analysis in terms
of power. His framework permits him to use his material without regard to
time and space, and thereby to avoid the nation-by-nation approach which often
compares units so large as to be incomparable.
Loewenstein's analysis is most successful when applied to those forms and
techniques of power control which have become more or less institutionalized-
formal "interorgan" controls such as exist between the executive and the as-
sembly, and "intraorgan" controls such as bicameralism or a collegiate form of
executive. There are areas, however, where one must go beyond descriptive
terms to understand what a particular "control" means. For example, Loewen-
stein treats guaranties of individual liberties as a "vertical" control, limiting the
exercise of power on all levels of the governmental structure. He does not
adequately explain why a nation may choose to respect civil liberties at one
time and not another, or why a nation may protect one area of individual liber-
ty but not another. These are essentially sociological questions, and Loewen-
stein barely scratches the surface.
Emphasis on the forms and techniques of government results in a more serious
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essentially abstractions. They are examined, it is true, in terms of the "reality"
of their role in the governmental process-what they accomplish, rather than
what they are supposed to accomplish. But the discussion lacks major refer-
ences to one essential element in that process, the people who govern and those
who are governed. Early in the book, the author rejects a purely sociological
or socio-psychological method of classifying states.4 One may argue with some
of his reasons. In any event, it can hardly be denied that personalities have an
effect on how power is shared, and that a people's sociological makeup, temporary
though it may be, can explain why the power relationship in one state differs
from, or is similar to, that in another. One cannot really analyze American fed-
eralism without discussing Franklin Roosevelt (Loewenstein makes but a pass-
ing reference to the "Roosevelt court" 5 ) ; nor will contemporary France be ex-
plainable without an understanding of DeGaulle. Comparison of power concen-
trations in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia can, on the surface at least, be
easily made. Even an elementary treatise on comparative government can show
that power does not really reside where the Soviet constitution seems to place
it. The contribution of comparison rests in the discovery of causal factors in-
fluencing government, and these rarely can be found in the governmental in-
stitutions themselves. The comprehensive work might well supply some of the
missing material.
A few specific comments for the lawyer-reader may be in order. Professor
Loewenstein has himself had legal training, and he has included sections of more
than routine interest to the lawyer concerned with the judiciary's role in gov-
ernment. The chapter on "Interorgan Controls of the Judiciary Over the
Government and the Parliament" contains a comparative study of the problem
of designating judicial personnel. It sketches the basic forms from the charm-
ingly simple practice of purchasing the office (in prerevolutionary France) to
election and appointment, and discusses the complicated but apparently suc-
cessful system of "in-service cooptation" (in Italy and France), under which a
professional elite rises through the ranks of the judiciary on the basis of merit,
initial entry having been obtained through a competitive process of training and
selection. The chapter includes also a good comparative treatment of judicial
review, although it is unfortunately marred by a surprising naivete about the
United States itself. Professor Loewenstein considers the protection of civil
liberties a "legitimate" area of judicial review and states that as such it presents
a "none-too-difficult" task where, as in the United States, "the fundamental
rights are guaranteed unconditionally" instead of being related to the needs of
government. 6 While the reader is trying to fit the due process clause into that
formulation, Loewenstein advances the view, stated as fact, that "no genuine
policy decision was involved" in the Segregation Cases. What the Supreme
Court did was merely to reinterpret its own previous jurisprudence in Plessy





v. Ferguson and to harmonize it with the substantive and literal intent of the
Constitution."'7 He errs, also, at least in the light of recent Court decisions, in
overemphasizing the doctrines of judicial restraint and the avoidance of "politi-
cal questions" as ameliorating counterweights to the problems judicial review
raises in a democracy. Such errors and oversimplifications, however, are more
annoying than crucial to the worth of the book. And they, too, may be corrected
in the larger work.
LEONARD M. LEIMANt
AMERICA AS A CIVILIZATION. By Max Lerner. New York: Simon and Schus-
ter, 1957. Pp. xiii, 1036, Index. $10.00.
IN his introduction to De Tocqueville's Democracy in America, Henry Steele
Commager observes that "of all the thousands of books on America, perhaps
less than two score are of lasting value."1 "Why," Professor Commager asks,
"is the average so low, why is so much of the stuff mediocre or worse? Why,
especially, have men and women otherwise thoughtful, learned, and observant,
failed so signally to understand and interpret the United States ?-2 He answers
his own question by pointing out that "many, if not most, of those who wrote
about America, came here with a closed mind, came not to learn but to confirm
preconceived notions. They assumed.., that the Old World was the norm and
interpreted every deviation from that norm as quaint, vulgar, or eccentric....
Few of those who wrote so glibly on America saw the whole of it .... [T~hey
wrote [for] ... an audience notoriously uncritical and credulous in everything
concerning America.... [O]nly a handful were intellectually competent to the
task. . . ." Although Professor Commager's comments are directed at Euro-
pean visitors writing about the American character and experience, they are
not altogether inapplicable to the vast majority of Americans whose books
analyze their native United States.
Just as De Tocqueville's book is one of the very few foreign exceptions, so
Max Lerner's America as a Civilization is an American exception which prom-
ises to take its place alongside the very few of lasting value. One can sense in
these pages an emulation of de Tocqueville, for Lerner wrote neither with a
closed mind nor to confirm preconceived notions. Instead, he has undertaken
a comprehensive analysis which attempts boldly to portray the whole while re-
specting the importance of detail. In so doing, he has challenged many con-
ventional views, such as the Turner frontier thesis which, Lerner says, "has
been used subtly to bolster the argument from individualism-and therefore
7. P. 247.
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